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I. INTRODUCTION
T hat a corporation should be "incorporated" in, or "chartered" by, a
particular state is a peculiar and vexing circumstance. It is by no
means immutable. A federal corporations code has been mooted about,
multi-state-chartered corporations occasionally appear, and murmurs of
doing away with the entire concept of "chartering" a corporation have
been heard from time to time. But state incorporation is the ruling
corporate form, and the problem it creates is a serious and thorny one: the
problem, that is, of regulating "foreign" corporations. How far may one
state go in regulating another state's corporations?
Traditionally, the answer to this question has been that a state may not
regulate a foreign corporation's "internal" affairs., The incorporating
state alone, it is said, may govern matters affecting the corporation, its
* Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, New York; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1986.
1 See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 621 (1983); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977); Davis & Cox v.
Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1527 (9th Cir. 1985).
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stockholders and directors inter se.2 Without this "internal affairs
doctrine," some have warned, corporate governance could be plunged into
a paralyzing choice-of-law confusion.3 Even the Second Restatement of
Conflicts of Law clings tenaciously to the internal affairs doctrine4 while
advocating a much looser "interest analysis" for most other conflicts
situations. Yet for all its advocacy, the Restatement never contends, or
even suggests, that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally
mandated.
The Supreme Court, however, confronted in two cases with state
regulation of corporate takeovers, may now be saying just that. First, in
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,5 the Court held that an Illinois takeover statute
purporting to regulate both domestic and foreign corporations violated
the Commerce Clause. Justice White's majority opinion included lan-
guage so broad as to intimate that any state regulation of the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation might be unconstitutional.6
Then, in 1987, in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 7 the Court upheld an
Indiana takeover law directed only at domestically chartered corpora-
tions. The Indiana statute, called a "control shares" statute, prevented
acquirors from obtaining control of a corporation unless a majority of the
shareholders consented to the acquisition in advance.8 In upholding this
law against a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court once again sug-
gested that a law regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations
might not pass constitutional muster:
This Court's recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated
statutes that adversely may affect interstate commerce by sub-
jecting activities to inconsistent regulations .... The Indiana Act
poses no such problem. So long as each State regulates voting
rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONflICT OF LAWS § 302 comment a (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
' See, e.g., Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 778 F.2d 547, 550 (10th Cir.
1985); Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 48-50 (1985); Reese &
Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith
and Credit, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 1118, 1126-27 (1958).
' See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 302-10.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
6 See id. at 645-46 ("Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign
corporations.").
7 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
' IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1986). The Indiana Act works as follows: If a person
acquires stock, bringing his holding over certain designated thresholds (20%, 33-1/3%, or
50%), his stock purchase does not carry voting power with it unless a majority of
disinterested shareholders-at a general or special meeting-vote to confer such voting
power upon him. About a dozen states currently have control shares statutes, most of which
are substantially similar to the Indiana act.
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be subject to the law of only one State. . . . Accordingly, we
conclude that the Indiana Act does not create an impermissible
risk of inconsistent regulation by different States.9
In two cases, McDermott v. Lewis'0 and TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex
Corp.,1 courts have already drawn from this language the inference
suggested above: that a state cannot regulate the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation (at least with respect to shareholder voting rights)
without violating the Commerce Clause.'
2
This inference is without doubt an appealing one. It provides a clean,
clear constitutional rule at a time when the Constitution has been
otherwise providing nothing but unwieldy standards. It makes a certain
intuitive sense. And it even seems to be a logical deduction from the
Court's holding in CTS.
Unfortunately, the inference is also untenable. The holding in Telex
and McDermott is not logically required by anything the Court said in
CTS.13 There has never been and could not be a rule under the Commerce
Clause that all state laws subjecting interstate commerce to a risk of
inconsistent regulations are unconstitutional.14 The Court cannot have
meant in CTS to constitutionalize the internal affairs doctrine; or, if the
Court was leaning in that direction, it owes us a much better account of
this conclusion than has yet been presented.
The problem is, of course, that many of this country's corporations are
incorporated in states where they neither do substantial business nor
have substantial numbers of shareholders. Whether viewed from the
standpoint of the constitutional text, precedent, or policy, it cannot per se
violate the Commerce Clause for a state to regulate the "internal affairs,"
or in particular the shareholder voting rights, of a corporation that is
9 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
'o 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987) [hereinafter McDermott]. The McDermott court held
that Panamanian law governed the voting rights of a Delaware subsidiary that held shares
in its parent company, a Panamanian corporation. Id. at 218-19.
11 679 F. Supp 1022, 1033 (W.D. Okla. 1987). In Telex, the court held on a preliminary
injunction motion that Oklahoma's control shares statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1145-55
(1988), was unconstitutional as applied to foreign corporations. Id.
12 See also Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988) (dictum)
(drawing the same conclusion); Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the
Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (1987) (noting the
Supreme Court's strong suggestion of this conclusion in CTS).
13 All CTS says is that the Indiana statute, even if adopted in every state, would create
no risk of conflicting state laws, and thus poses no "inconsistent regulations" problem
whatsoever. That proposition is simple enough. It does not follow, however, that any statute
which (if adopted in every state) would create a risk of conflicting state laws necessarily
violates the Commerce Clause. As CTS itself acknowledges, a risk of conflicting regulations
may yet be "permissible" under the Commerce Clause. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
14 See infra Part 11.
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nominally foreign, but that has its most substantial business and
shareholder contacts with the regulating state.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: "INCONSISTENT REGULATIONS"
VERSUS CONFLICTS OF LAW
The critical language in CTS is the Court's statement that the
Commerce Clause may invalidate statutes that "subject[] activities to
inconsistent regulations."'1 A reader might suppose that this formulation
referred to some well-established Commerce Clause principle to the effect
that a state law is invalid if it potentially subjects an actor in interstate
commerce to simultaneous, but conflicting, legal obligations. The Com-
merce Clause, it might be thought, provides a federal remedy for
commercial actors caught between conflicting state laws. Indeed, the
Telex court went still further, stating that the Commerce Clause not only
invalidates laws that actually subject commerce to conflicting regula-
tions, but also laws that simply create the risk of such conflicts in that
other states might pass regulations inconsistent with the law at issue at
some future time.'6
In fact, a moment's reflection reveals the falsity of this reasoning.
Nothing is more common than the subjection of interstate commerce to
conflicting state laws. It would be absurd to say, for example, that New
York contract law violates the Commerce Clause to the extent it subjects
out-of-state transactions to regulations inconsistent with the law of the
state in which the transaction takes place. New York applies its law of
contracts to out-of-state transactions every day, even when its law
directly conflicts with that of the locus state. And why, for that matter,
would we invalidate the New York law rather than the other state's law
even if a Commerce Clause problem were presented? The fact is that there
has never been, and could not be, any general Commerce Clause principle
prohibiting the conflict of laws. Instead, there is a field ofjurisprudence-
the conflict of laws, of course-that is meant to resolve such difficulties.
Now, at least until MITE and CTS, the internal affairs doctrine was
understood to be a rule emanating out of conflicts-of-law jurisprudence.
Where questions arose concerning which state's law was to govern a
controversy involving a corporation, the internal affairs doctrine would
be trotted out to help provide an answer. It must be understood at the
outset that the Supreme Court has never held that the Commerce Clause
requires states to follow any particular choice-of-law rule. If there were a
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which is more or less expressly directed
'5 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
lb Telex, 679 F. Supp. at 1031.
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to interstate conflicts of law. 17 And although for a time, several decades
ago, the Court appeared to have held that this Clause did indeed
constitutionalize the internal affairs doctrine,1 8 it is now settled that Full
Faith and Credit imposes only minimal restrictions on a state choosing to
apply its own law to a given controversy.19
By contrast to Full Faith and Credit analysis, the "inconsistent
regulations" branch of Commerce Clause analysis has ultimately con-
cerned conflicts between state and federal regulatory power. To be sure,
the "inconsistent regulations" involved in Commerce Clause cases have
been interstate inconsistencies: numerous decisions have struck down
state laws under the Commerce Clause that conflicted with, or could have
conflicted with, the laws of other states.20 Nevertheless, none of these
cases was a choice-of-law case; none was a case in which one state's law
had to be chosen over that of another.
"7 In fact, before MITE, studies of the foreign corporations problem almost invariably
discussed only the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses as the possible
constitutional pegs on which the internal affairs rule might be hung. See, e.g., Baraf, The
Foreign Corporation: A Problem in Conflict of Laws Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 219,
237-47 (1966); Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HAEv. L. REV. 433,
457-67 (1950); Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV.
433, 445-60 (1968); Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 137, 162-66 (1955);
Reese & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1129. But see Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a
Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 Hnav. L. REV. 806, 826 (1971). Indeed,
hornbooks on conflicts of law occasionally omitted the Commerce Clause altogether when
discussing potential constitutional limitations on choice-of-law doctrine. See, e.g., E. ScoLt
& P. HAY, CoNF'ucT OF LAWS 79-110 (1982) (considering the implications of the Due Process,
Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses).
's See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1935).
15 Under the modern view of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state may apply its own
law to a controversy provided only that it has "significant contacts" with the matter at issue.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985). It is worth noting that the
Delaware Supreme Court, while acknowledging some "uncertainties" on the subject,
nevertheless argued in McDermott that the old Broderick line of cases was still good law. See
McDermott, 531 A.2d at 218. The court failed, however, to cite Phillips which, by adopting
the "significant contacts" test, plainly delivered the final blow to the old-line Full Faith and
Credit doctrine that had very nearly constitutionalized traditional (i.e., pre-interest
analysis) conflicts law. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); see generally
Buxbaum, supra note 12, at 43-44,47-50 (discussing the weakening of Full Faith and Credit
doctrine in the corporation law context); Kaplan supra note 17, at 445-48.
20 See, e.g., Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invali-
dating 55-foot limit on truck lengths); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)
(invaliding certain truck mudguard regulations); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946)
(invalidating requirement of racial segregation on buses); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 711 (1945) (invalidating limitation on train lengths); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1
(1937) (invalidating certain regulations on ship design and operation); South Covington &
Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915) (invalidating limitation on number
of passengers to be carried in train cars); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (invalidating
requirement of equal accommodation for blacks on steamboats).
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Take Morgan v. Virginia,21 which, despite somewhat off-color facts, is
a prototypical inconsistent-regulations Commerce Clause case. There,
the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's statute requiring motor
carriers to segregate black and white passengers. (The ground of invali-
dation was not the fourteenth amendment, but the Commerce Clause.)
Other states had laws forbidding racial segregation of passengers. The
effect of this inconsistency was that passengers "must if necessary
repeatedly shift seats" at state borders2 2 and that carriers were burdened
by a "crazy-quilt . . . of contradictory and confusing State laws."23 The
Court held that a "single, uniform rule" was necessary in this area "to
promote and protect national travel. '24 The Court struck down Virginia's
law on the ground that Congress alone had authority to regulate in this
area.
The difference between cases such as Morgan v. Virginia and a
choice-of-law case is plain. In a choice-of-law case, two or more states'
laws are simultaneously competing for application to a single contro-
versy. The conflict is resolved by choosing one state's law or another's as
the sole applicable law. By contrast, as Morgan exemplifies, in the
Commerce Clause "inconsistent regulations" cases, the laws of more than
one state would have applied not simultaneously, but each in turn. The
problem is caused by the peculiarly ambulatory nature of commerce:
carriers may be unable practicably to accommodate the inconsistent laws
even though never subject to simultaneously conflicting obligations.
The solution in these cases is not, therefore, a matter of choosing and
applying one state's law. There was no question in Morgan of applying
another state's law to carriers passing through Virginia. Nor was there
any question of establishing nationwide uniformity by holding that the
law of any particular state was alone applicable throughout the country.
When the Court held Virginia's statute unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, it was saying that only a federal, congressional law,
could be applicable. The inconsistency among state laws in Morgan was
a Commerce Clause question only because it implicated a conflict
between state and federal regulatory power.
What Morgan -illustrates is a simple, essential rule of Commerce
Clause analysis: the uniformity interest underlying that clause is not to
be achieved, or at least has never in the past been achieved, by holding
that one state's law is applicable throughout a region or throughout the
entire nation. If a state threatens to subject commerce to regulations
inconsistent with those of other states, and if the need for uniformity is
great enough, state law may have to yield to federal regulatnry power
21 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
22 Id. at 381.
23 Id. at 388 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 386.
[Vol. 36:355
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The principle, as the Morgan Court put it, is this: "Where uniformity is
essential for the functioning of commerce, a state may not interpose its
local regulation." 25 Thus the conflict is never resolved by holding that the
law of one state is supreme under the Commerce Clause with respect to
other states' laws. The holding is that no state can regulate the subject
matter in question. The Commerce Clause, in its inconsistent regulations
branch, applies to conflicts not between state laws per se, but between
state and federal regulatory power.
20
No such state/federal conflict arises out of a control shares statute. Or
rather, to the extent that a state/federal conflict is presented in this
context, CTS has made it absolutely clear that state law can and will
govern corporate share voting rights.27 The only question is which state's
law is to govern. And that is a choice-of-law question, not a Commerce
Clause question.
To restate the argument: It is plain that with respect to a particular
corporation's self-governance in the face of a tender offer, one law alone
must have nationwide effect. But this need for a single applicable state
law forces us simply to decide a choice-of-state-law question. It is not the
need for a uniform, nationwide rule of law that would force us to decide
against any state regulation of the matter. Or at least, CTS has squarely
confronted that issue and decided in favor of state law. The situation
would be different if an inconsistency among different corporations'
self-governance rules created special burdens on interstate commerce. If
there were some need for nationwide uniformity of shareholder voter
rights as among all corporations generally, then the Commerce Clause
25 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946). This principle derives from Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (holding that the Commerce Clause
prohibits states from regulating matters that "are in their nature national, or admit of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation.").
" Most of the "inconsistent regulations" cases, see supra note 20, fit the very same mold
as Morgan. That is, their essential holding was that no state could constitutionally regulate
the subject matter at issue. In some of the relatively more recent cases, however, such as
Kassell and Bibb, the Court has struck down transportation regulations inconsistent with
those of other states on the ground that the law served no real safety purposes and (because
of its inconsistency with the laws of surrounding states) imposed excessive burdens on the
movement of goods. These cases differ from the first line because the holding is not that
states are precluded entirely from regulating the subject matter at issue. They are similar,
however, in that no choice-of-law issue was presented. That is, the Court was not faced with
a question of applying one state's law as opposed to another's and did not hold that
uniformity was to be achieved by making one state's law the national rule for any particular
actor (as would be the case if it were held that only the incorporating state could
constitutionally regulate a corporation's voting rights). Because these cases essentially turn
on a balancing of the benefits and burdens of the state law at issue, they are better
understood as part of the "excessive burdens" branch of Commerce Clause analysis, rather
than as part of a separate "inconsistent regulations" branch. The "excessive burdens" test
as applied to the regulation of foreign corporations is considered in Part III(C) infra.
27 CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1650 (1987).
1988]
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might well be invoked to displace all state law (with respect to this issue)
in favor of a federal regulatory power. But the need for a single governing
law as to one corporation's shareholder voting rights is very different
from the need for a single uniform law as to all corporations' shareholder
voting rights. In the former case there is no question of displacing state
law in favor of federal legislative authority, but simply of choosing one
state's law or another's.
The Commerce Clause has, in fact, almost never been held to displace
one state's law in favor of another state's law. 2s And by its own terms,
how could it? Surely the Commerce Clause, as a grant of power to the
federal government, can displace state law only in favor of the federal
power to regulate. How can a pure choice between state laws implicate
the Commerce Clause?
III. OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE OTHER BRANCHES
OF COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Doubters will doubtless say that although most choice-of-law issues are
foreign to the Commerce Clause, regulation of corporations may be a
different case. There are a number of ways to support this claim, each
drawing on other branches of Commerce Clause analysis.
2' An exception might arguably be Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority, 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986). Brown-Forman involved a New York law that
required liquor distillers to post the prices they would charge New York wholesalers during
the upcoming month and made it unlawful to charge out-of-state wholesalers a lower price
during that month. The Court held the law unconstitutional as a "direct" regulation of
interstate commerce. Id. at 2086. There are hints, however, in the Court's opinion that one
of the bases of its decision was the possibility that the law might render illegal an act
required by another state's law. See id. at 2087. This language might be said to imply that
a statute creating the possibility of such a conflict violates the Commerce Clause and must
give way to the law of other states.
The latter, however, cannot be the ground of Brown-Forman because it makes no sense.
Why did the New York law have to give way rather than the other state's law because it
was the law first challenged? As noted in the text above, states constantly subject
commercial conduct to conflicting laws. This situation cannot without more amount to a
Commerce Clause violation.
A more coherent rationale for Brown-Forman is that New York was regulating acts of
interstate commerce as to which it had no legitimate interest. New York could perhaps
penalize liquor distillers if they failed to offer New York wholesalers the same price they
offer out-of-state wholesalers; but in principle New York has not interest in the seller's mere
act of offering his products at a lower price elsewhere. Cf. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extra-
territorial State Legislation, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1865, 1902-04 (1987) (arguing that Brown-
Forman is to be explained not by reference to the Commerce Clause, but to an implicit
constitutional prohibition against completely extraterritorial state legislation).
As to the argument that a state has no actual, legitimate interest in the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation, see infra Parts II(C) and IV(B).
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After all, the Commerce Clause addresses more than "inconsistent
regulations." It also prohibits states (according to the various formula-
tions used from time to time) from "directly" regulating interstate
commerce, 29 "discriminating" against interstate commerce, 30 or imposing
"excessive burdens" on interstate commerce.3 1 An argument can be made
from each of these branches of Commerce Clause analysis that a control
shares statute regulating "foreign" corporations would be unconstitu-
tional. None of these arguments seems ultimately persuasive.
A. Direct Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Most choice-of-law questions, it might be said, do not "inherently"
implicate interstate commerce the way that regulation of a foreign
corporation does. A tender offer is a nationwide transaction, inviting a
transfer of corporate securities all over the country. If Oklahoma regu-
lates corporate voting rights in a tender offer for shares of a Delaware
corporation, isn't Oklahoma "directly" regulating interstate commerce?
The notion of "direct" as opposed to "indirect" regulation of interstate
commerce is probably so elastic that it cannot be analytically useful. In
fact, at least until quite recently, most modern commentators believed
that Chief Justice Stone had done away with the direct/indirect branch of
Commerce Clause analysis almost a half century ago. 32 Nevertheless, the
Court apparently resurrected the direct/indirect distinction in the recent
Commerce Clause case of Brown-Forman Distillers, Inc. v. New York
State Liquor Authority.33 Thus for good or ill, the "direct regulation"
doctrine seems still to be with us.
There is, however, a logical flaw in attempting to apply that doctrine
here, even assuming arguendo that direct regulation is involved. Where
the Supreme Court has struck down a law as a direct regulation of
interstate commerce, the holding has of course been that no state could
29 E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 106 S. Ct.
2080 (1986). The vitality of the "direct regulation" doctrine is open to question. See infra
Part III(A).
30 E.g., CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648-49; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
36-37 (1980). See infra Part III(B).
31 This test is usually identified with the case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970). See infra Part III(C).
32 See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (in
"making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with commerce, we are
doing little more than using labels to describe a result."). Chief Justice Stone's view,
supported by influential commentary, appeared to have prevailed when he wrote the Court's
opinion in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). See generally, 1 R. RYrUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YouNo, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW-SUsTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 11.6-11.7 (1986).
33 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084, 2087 (1986). But cf. Arkansas Elec. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (disparaging the "supposedly precise division between
'direct' and 'indirect' effects on interstate commerce.").
19881
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constitutionally make such a law. The reason is, once again, that the
Commerce Clause is in this line of analysis addressed to conflicts between
state and federal regulatory power: if a law "directly" regulates interstate
commerce, the argument goes, only the federal government has the
power to enact it. When it comes to a control shares statute, however,
some state is going to be "directly" regulating interstate commerce,
whether it be the state of incorporation or another state. In short, CTS
stands as a square rejection of the idea that a control shares statute
"directly" regulates interstate commerce. 34
It might be suggested that the incorporating state would not be subject
to this charge because the corporate shares are always somehow "sit-
uated" in the incorporating state; hence, in regulating such shares,
Delaware, for example, would always be primarily regulating Delaware
commerce. But no one has accepted the situs view of corporate shares
since Shaffer v. Heitner.3 5 If Delaware regulates a nationwide tender offer
for the shares of a corporation, Delaware is regulating interstate com-
merce; this regulation cannot seriously be called less "direct" if the
corporation at issue happens to have been chartered in Delaware.3 6
Moreover, an objection to the extraterritorial scope of a control shares
" See CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) ("[L]aws [regulating
corporate governance] necessarily affect certain aspects of interstate commerce. This
necessarily is true with respect to corporations with shareholders in states other than the
state of incorporation."). See also Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 845 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that the CTS "majority opinion sub silentio dismisses the 'direct
restraint' per se test.").
35 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
'" This assertion is borne out by Justice White's plurality opinion in MITE and
dissenting opinion in CTS. Justice White argued that the statutes in both cases were
"direct" regulations of interstate commerce and therefore invalid. See Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion); CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1654-55 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White's opinions are at least consistent: if the direct/indirect analysis is
to be applied to state takeover legislation, it makes no difference whether the statute
applies to foreign corporations, as in MITE, or only to domestic ones, as in CTS. Both would
be invalid.
It might be argued, however, that Delaware has a legitimate interest in regulating the
shares of its corporations, no matter where they are held, but that no other state has an
interest in regulating these shares anywhere outside of that other state's borders. This
argument is no longer raising a "direct regulation" challenge, but rather a challenge to the
regulating state's interests in the legislation. This challenge is dealt with below. See infra
Part III(C).
It might also be said that what saves a contrn qhqr tOt,,te fromn the charge of"direct"
regulation is that a control shares statute merely regulates the voting rights that the shares
carry, rather than prohibiting the actual sale of the shares: while a prohibition of transfers
of shares would be a "direct" regulation of interstate commerce (this argument goes), the
regulation of voting rights is not. One hopes, of course, that the Supreme Court was not
relying on a distinction so fictitious as this in CTS. In any event this point is irrelevant to
the discussion here. If this fiction were the saving feature, it would equally save control
share statutes directed at both domestic and foreign corporations.
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statute proves far too much: the same objection could be made in other
contexts where no constitutional problems have ever been thought to
exist. Consider contract law. As noted earlier, New York will frequently
apply its law to contracts executed and even performed in part elsewhere,
so long as the contract has substantial ties to New York. Indeed, New
York might even condition the assignment of rights or delegation of
duties under a contract executed out of state on the consent of parties who
are New York residents (as well, perhaps, as other parties who are not).
That situation would be, in certain respects, exactly analogous to that of
a control shares statute applied to foreign corporations. Yet no one has
ever seriously contended that New York contract law (or the traditional
choice-of-law rule permitting New York to give its law extraterritorial
effect) violates the Commerce Clause as a "direct" regulation of interstate
commerce .37
The troublesome fact is that some matters traditionally left to state law
are predominantly interstate in fact, yet jurisdictionally indivisible in
nature. By "jurisdictionally indivisible," I mean that the law of only one
jurisdiction may practicably be applied, even though the transaction
takes place across jurisdictions. In these circumstances, inevitably one
state's law must receive extraterritorial application. The assignment of a
contract may sometimes be one such matter; corporate governance may
sometimes be another.
These matters cannot be divided like the movement of a train or bus
through various states, where each state's law may apply in turn. One
law alone must govern, yet they remain primarily interstate in their real,
practical effects. The Commerce Clause could be held to disable any state
from regulating such matters on the ground that only a single, federal
rule should apply. But this has never been the law; nor will it be the law
so long as we have a system in which primary rights and duties, whether
17 Professor Regan argues in his "twin" essays on CTS and extraterritoriality, see supra
note 28, that the real holding of CTS is that the event comprising the transfer of control of
a corporation "occurs in" the incorporating state, which thus alone has power to regulate it.
See Regan, supra note 28, at 1875-77. His analysis makes "extraterritoriality" the critical
element of unconstitutionality. Regan never confronts, however, the manifest extraterrito-
riality of ordinary contract (or tort) law as applied to out-of-state conduct that has certain
in-state contacts or effects. To insist that in every such case, the regulated event (perhaps
as basic an event as the sale of goods known to be headed for another state) "occurred" in
the state whose law is eventually applied is analytically without value. It would be a
completely conclusory statement that presupposed some other, more substantial inquiry,
probably having to do with "contacts" or "connections" with the regulating state-i.e., the
ordinary choice-of-law and due process concerns. Thus, for example, Regan's argument for
the internal affairs rule begs the question: why should we say that corporate transfers of
control occur in the state of incorporation rather than in the state of the corporation's "real"
(i.e., business) domicile? Regan's answer that the incorporating state alone has a "con-
nection" to the "legal identity and ownership" of the corporation-is patently circular. Id. at
1899.
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in tort, contract or corporation law, are defined largely by the states. An
Oklahoma control shares statute applicable to nominally "foreign" cor-
porations regulates interstate commerce no more or no less (and certainly
no more or no less "directly") than traditional contract law in some
situations or than a Delaware control shares statute applicable solely to
"Delaware" corporations.38 The only question is which state's law is to
govern.
B. Protectionist Legislation
The implied limitations on state power found in the Commerce Clause
are perhaps most centrally concerned with state laws that protect local
commercial interests at the expense of free interstate trade.3 9 It might be
thought that a state, attempting to hinder corporate takeovers primarily
in order to protect local business communities, is guilty of this protec-
tionist charge. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that so long
as a law applies "evenhandedly" to in-state and out-of-state actors, it will
not be held to violate the Commerce Clause on this ground.40 As the
Court noted in CTS, a voting rights statute of the sort discussed here may
not constitutionally favor in-state over out-of-state acquirors, but if the
law avoids this flaw, however, it cannot be said to discriminate against
interstate commerce.4 '
C. Burdening Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., that local laws
violate the Commerce Clause if they impose burdens on interstate
commerce "clearly excessive" in relation to the local interests served.
42
This balancing test, which Justice Scalia so sharply criticized in CTS,
43
requires somewhat lengthier consideration.
1. The Balancing Test Absent Choice-of-Law Concerns
Putting aside, temporarily, all choice-of-law difficulties, it seems plain
that under CTS a control shares statute directed at foreign corporations
with substantial in-state contacts must survive the Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. test. The reason is that (absent choice-of-law questions) the burdens
"8 See Coleman, supra note 17, at 460 (pointing out that regulations of foreign
corporations crnnot hbe unconsttutinal solely beaus of their "extratr.. it --. _ e. -"
9 See CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987) ("The principal
objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against
interstate commerce.").
4" E.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981).
41 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
42 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
43 CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 163 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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on interstate commerce are identical to those imposed by the statute
upheld in CTS, while the benefits are no less substantial.
A control shares statute is designed to prevent a tender offer from
succeeding when a majority of shareholders choose to reject it. That effect
on commerce is not necessarily a "burden" at all; assuming that such a
tender offer would otherwise have "coerced" unwilling shareholders into
selling their shares, there are good reasons for calling it a benefit to
interstate commerce. This aspect of the consequences of a control shares
statute may explain why the Supreme Court in CTS did not consider the
burdens on commerce to be particularly heavy.
Certainly one could find economists who would disagree with this view.
Moreover, a control shares statute may also have effects on interstate
commerce that would clearly constitute burdens: it might delay the
consummation of tender offers for a few weeks, it might make tender
offers slightly more costly, and it might arguably deter the initiation of
some tender offers that shareholders would have willingly accepted. The
point, however, is that any control shares statute will have these effects.
It makes no difference in this respect whether Delaware or Oklahoma is
the regulating state. Thus the interstate burdens of a control shares
statute will be identical whether or not it applies to foreign corporations.
As for benefits, CTS is less dispositive because the local interests at
stake are not identical with regard to the regulation of foreign as opposed
to domestic corporations. It seems hardly open to doubt, however, that a
state having the preponderant business and shareholder contacts with a
corporation has at least as great an interest in protecting that corporation
from a coercive takeover as does the state whose only contact with the
corporation is the chartering document.
It is true that CTS noted the interest a state has in governing the
operations of those corporations it has "created."44 But if we strip away
the metaphorical gauze surrounding that notion, what interest does the
incorporating state actually have? Its interest lies in defining its corpo-
rations law in the manner most conducive to in-state incorporation or
investment. This can be a considerable interest indeed, as Delaware has
taught us again and again. But another state will have an equally
considerable interest in defining its foreign corporations law in the
manner most conducive to doing business and investing in that state. In
addition, the protection of existing business communities is arguably an
even stronger interest.45 Finally, the protection of resident shareholders
4 107 S. Ct. at 1649-50.
41 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in
part). It should be noted that Justice Powell's concurrence in MITE provided the necessary
fifth vote for the MITE majority.
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is undeniably an independent, substantial and legitimate state in-
terest.
46
If in CTS the Court had stressed the gravity of the burdens imposed by
a control shares statute, but had found that the local interests in that case
were so compelling that they outweighed even these substantial burdens,
the situation might be different. The language in CTS, however, is of an
entirely milder character. The Court referred to the paucity of evidence
indicating that the Indiana statute would actually inhibit tender offers.47
It spoke of the "limited extent [to which] the Act affects interstate
commerce." 4s3 And the Court's discussion of the Indiana Act's benefits
primarily serves to defend the modest proposition that Indiana was
furthering a legitimate interest,49 not an interest so compelling that it
would outweigh serious impediments to commerce. No one can doubt that
a state has a legitimate interest in protecting a corporation's local
business relations and resident shareholders, even if the corporation is
nominally a "foreign" one.
An objection to the foregoing could be made by invoking certain
language of Justice White's from the majority opinion in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.:
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
nonresident shareholders. Insofar as Illinois law burdens out-of-
state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance
to sustain the law. 50
Putting this language together with the holding in CTS, the Telex court
reasoned that a state does have an interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders of its own corporations, but no such interest with regard to
nonresident shareholders of foreign corporations. 51 The objection, then, is
that a control shares statute applicable to foreign corporations must
violate the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. test because, with respect to
out-of-state shareholders who are clearly burdened, "there is nothing to
be weighed in the balance to sustain the law." This reasoning, perhaps
appealing on the surface, unravels altogether upon inspection.
First, it begs the question. One real issue at stake here is ultimately
" See CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1651-52.
50 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
51 See TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (W.D. Okla. 1987);
see also McDermott v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 n.12 (Del. 1987) (making a similar
argument). Actually, Justice White pretty clearly meant his language to encompass even
nonresident shareholders of domestic corporations (as was the case in MITE).
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whether the corporation "belongs," at least for this particular purpose,
more to the incorporating state or to the state in which it does its
principal business. If the latter, then Oklahoma can claim just as much of
an interest as Delaware in protecting nonresident shareholders.
Second, Justice White's language is in any event quite puzzling. There
certainly is something to be weighed in the balance against the law's
out-of-state burdens: namely the in-state benefits. Justice White cannot
be saying that a statute's burdens on out-of-state transactions may be
offset only by benefits to out-of-state transactions. That would be absurd;
virtually every state law placing a burden on interstate commerce would
fail that test. The whole point of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (for good or ill)
is that courts must weigh the local benefits against the out-of-state
burdens. 52 The better interpretation of Justice White's language is that
he meant to say that a state has no interest in protecting only nonresident
shareholders. (He noted elsewhere in his opinion that the statute at issue
in MITE could apply even if there were no resident shareholders.)5 3 As
the Court said in CTS, so long as the statute in question applies only to
corporations meeting significant resident shareholder requirements,
"every application of the [statute] will affect a substantial number of
[state] residents, whom [the state] indisputably has an interest in
protecting."54
Another way of stating what is really the essential point is that a state
is not necessarily forbidden to protect nonresidents if doing so is the only
way under the circumstances to protect residents as well. That is why the
Commerce Clause does not (for example) prevent a local government
from enforcing pollution standards against ships passing through the
locality, even when the ships must replace their engines in order to
comply so that the local government is in effect imposing its own
pollution standards outside the jurisdiction as well as inside it.55 The
local law may be such that it will invariably protect nonresidents as well,
but-with all respect to Justice White-that fact alone cannot possibly
render it invalid. In the case of corporate governance in general and
shareholder voting rights in particular, protecting nonresident share-
holders is often an indispensable part of protecting resident shareholders
as well.
Thus, absent the choice-of-law issues, a control shares statute applica-
52 This basic point seems to have been missed by some commentators as well. See, e.g.,
Kozyris, supra note 3, at 40 (arguing that Justice White's view "leaves nothing to be placed
in the constitutional balance under the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., to justify any state
interference in the internal affairs of 'foreign corporations"') (original emphasis) (footnote
omitted).
Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982).
5" CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987).
51 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 441, 448 (1960).
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ble to nominally foreign corporations with substantial in-state contacts
fares no worse under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. than a similar statute
applicable only to domestic corporations. Indeed in some cases, where the
corporation has far less substantial contacts with the incorporating state,
it almost certainly fares better. But there is another, completely distinct
burden that must be considered: the uncertainty of the choice of law
itself.
2. The Balancing Test as Affected by Choice-of-Law Uncertainty
This argument may well be the fundamental one. The real danger that
some perceive in allowing states to regulate the internal affairs of foreign
corporations is that commerce will not be able to bear the resulting
choice-of-law uncertainties. 56 Indeed, the Telex court opined that such
uncertainty could bring "tender offers to a sudden halt. '57 And the
Supreme Court in CTS expressed concern about the same problem. 58 This
burden, it might be said, is what causes a foreign-corporations control
shares statute to fail the Commerce Clause balancing test.
This argument is in fact quite a bit more novel and more difficult to
articulate than its proponents suppose. No case seems ever to have held
a law invalid under the Commerce Clause on the ground that it produces
choice-of-law uncertainties. Such uncertainty has apparently never even
been considered a Commerce Clause "burden" for purposes of the Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. test.
Consider once more contract law, which, compared to corporation law,
is of at least equal if not far greater importance to the flourishing of
interstate commerce. Choice-of-law uncertainty abounds here. Yet no one
suggests that the Commerce Clause requires a single, federal law of
contracts or, much less, a general rule stating that (for example) the
performance of a contract between Delaware citizens is to be governed by
Delaware law. And even though a single contract is to be performed in all
fifty states, no one supposes that New York would be violating the
Commerce Clause if, having the most contacts with the contract, it
applies its own law to an important, indivisible provision thereof.
It may be replied that interstate commerce has been able to assimilate
choice-of-law uncertainty in contract law primarily because private
parties are permitted to agree upon the applicable law. This is without
doubt an important point. But the answer is that the same may be done
and has been done with respect to corporations. Choice-of-law provisions
See sources cited supra note 3.
5' TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (W. D. Okla. 1987).
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1650. See also McDermott v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218 (Del. 1987)
("[Dlirectors, officers and shareholders [must] be given adequate notice of the jurisdiction
whose laws will ultimately govern the corporation's internal affairs.").
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in corporate charters occur occasionally, and the Supreme Court has
explicitly held that charter provisions can govern the applicable law. 59
More important, virtually every state control shares statute, including
those applicable to both domestic and foreign corporations, contains a
provision permitting the directors or shareholders of a corporation to opt
in or out of the statute's coverage. Thus the same devices that parties
employ to smooth out the choice-of-law wrinkles in contract law are also
available here.
The reason why state laws presenting conflicts problems have never
been held to violate the Commerce Clause despite the burdens they
impose on interstate business is at bottom straightforward: choice-of-law
uncertainties result from the very structure of a multi-sovereign legal
system, not from the law of any particular state. Laws with extra-
territorial scope present obvious problems for a multi-jurisdictional
system, but in the corporations context, as in contracts, at least one
state's law must in some cases be accorded extraterritorial application.60
Thus extraterritoriality itself is not at issue; the question is simply, once
again, which state is to receive the extraterritorial privilege. And that, it
would seem, is merely a choice-of-law problem which, like any other, is
to be resolved either through state conflicts law or through private
choice-of-law provisions. At the extremes there will always be
constitutional choice-of-law limits imposed by the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses. But if choice-of-law difficulties are the sole
issue, the Commerce Clause, it would seem, has little to do with it.
Nonetheless, it seems wise to try to evaluate the predictions of chaos
and doom made by adherents of the internal affairs doctrine. These
predictions, it will be seen, tend to overlook reality in a number of
respects.
First, it should be stressed that the thesis advocated here is by no
means a wholesale rejection of the internal affairs doctrine. To the
contrary, all that is at issue here is an exception to the doctrine where the
incorporating state has few if any real ties to the corporation, and where
another state has very substantial business and shareholder contacts
with the corporation. If a control shares statute covered only those foreign
corporations with which the legislating state could claim to have the most
substantial business contacts (as well, perhaps, as a significant number of
resident shareholders), then potential for conflicts would be minimized. 61
The only possible conflicts arising out of every state adopting such a
5 See, e.g., Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
60 See CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. at 1650 (1987); supra Part III(A).
6 For example, North Carolina's control shares statute applies only to those foreign
corporations having their principal place of business, at least 40% of their "fixed assets," at
least 40% of their employees and at least 10% of their shareholders in North Carolina. See
N.C. Bus. CoRP. ACT § 55-90(b)(5) (Supp. 1987).
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statute would be (1) occasional disputes about where the corporation's
true business domicile was,62 and (2) conflicts between the "business"
state and the incorporating state. This situation is a far cry from the
"chaos" pictured by the Telex court in which some nineteen states were
said to be able simultaneously to claim similar authority to regulate a
corporation's internal affairs. And when conflicts between two or three
states did arise, ordinary choice-of-law "interest analysis" or private
choice-of-law provisions would be available to resolve the matter.
If we keep our sights fixed on conflicts between the incorporating state
and the one or two other states able to claim some uniquely substantial
business and shareholder contacts with the corporation, it becomes much
easier to dispel any fears aroused by the relaxation of the internal affairs
doctrine. A number of jurisdictions already subject corporations to this
conflict, and commerce seems to be doing fine notwithstanding.
First, both New York and California have enacted laws explicitly
making their domestic corporations code applicable to certain nominally
foreign corporations. California's law applies to foreign corporations only
if more than 50% of their shares are owned by California residents and
they do more than 50% of their business (as computed by a specified set
of tests) in the state as well.63 Thus the California law squarely poses the
problem of a conflict between the state of incorporation and the state of
the corporation's business domicile. In addition, a third state could in
theory assert a claim on the ground that it was the home of a greater
number of individual shareholders (as opposed to a greater percentage of
shares) and/or the corporation's principal place of business (perhaps using
slightly different tests).
More than a decade has passed since California enacted its "pseudo-
foreign corporations law." No debilitating consequences have yet oc-
curred; commerce most certainly has not ground to a halt, and indeed no
one has even reported serious difficulties arising from the law. New York
62 The term "principal place of business" is subject to various interpretations, as we
know from federal court cases seeking to ascribe state citizenship to corporations under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1966). It has been argued that the "elusiveness" of the term for diversity
jurisdiction purposes demonstrates that a business domicile test would be impracticable for
choice-of-law purposes as well. See Kozyris, supra note 3, at 53. But there is no reason why
the term "principal place of business" cannot simply be defined in such a way as to eliminate
its "elusiveness." Courts or state legislatures may solve this problem by specifying a
definition of "principal place of business" in this context, concentrating not on such criteria
as location of executive offices, which have been employed in the diversity context, but on
numerical percentages of assets, employees, and revenues located or derived in-state that
would qualify the regulating state as having uniquely substantial business contacts with
the target corporation. Or such percentages could be specified in addition to a "principal
place of business" requirement. See supra note 58 (describing one such statute); see also CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115 (Deering 1977) discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-66.
63 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (Deering 1977).
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has had a similar law on its books for almost 100 years64 and the same is
true there as well.
In fact there are very few decisions under these "pseudo-foreign
corporations statutes" in either jurisdiction, which is perhaps the best
testimony that the statutes do not pose serious problems for corporations
or those doing business with them. As one commentator observed as far
back as 1968, the spectre of "unbearable chaos and uncertainty," of which
"the precise details ... are seldom stated," has not materialized:
The contention of the Restatement and of other commentators
that avoidance of confusion and difficulty makes it imperative to
look to the law of the state of incorporation seems belied by the
experience of New York. . . . [Although overlapping corporate
regulations have] created a situation of theoretical conflict, the
practical results have been accepted and viable, and the duplica-
tion of controls has resulted not so much in conflict as in
cumulative standards. 65
The reason why things have gone so smoothly may simply lie in the
overall similarity of the network of rules that various states impose on
corporations. But a supporter of Telex and McDermott might well inter-
pose a different reason: the New York and California statutes exempt
from their coverage all corporations listed on national stock exchanges. 66
Thus the major, national corporations do not have to cope with the
choice-of-law problems that the California and New York statutes might
create.
There are, however, other states that do not adhere at all to the
internal affairs doctrine, and look not to the law of the incorporating
state but instead to the law of the state where the corporation has its
principal place of business. These states are not American, but European.
The business domicile rule is in fact the general choice-of-law rule for
corporations throughout the Continent. 67 On the other hand, in England
(as in America) the rule is lex incorporationis.68 This potential conflict of
corporation laws should have generated all the commercial pandemo-
nium that some commentators have predicted. But the international
economic community seems to be surviving the conflict without any
" See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-20 (McKinney 1986). New York first passed laws
specifically applicable to foreign corporations in 1897, precisely because of the problem
engendered by the out-of-state incorporation of corporations otherwise based in New York
seeking to escape New York regulation and taxation. See Coleman, supra note 17, at 447.
65 Kaplan, supra note 17, at 476-77.
" New York did not permit this exemption, however, until the 1960's.
67 See A. CONARD, COPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 15 (1976); see generally 2 E. RABEL, THE
CONflICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33-68 (1960).
" See Kaplan, supra note 17, at 440.
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serious problems-or at least there is no indication that its problems
stem from corporation choice-of-law confusion.6 9
There is a final, important point to be made. The worst case scenario
conjured up by those opposed to the regulation of foreign corporations is
corporate paralysis: faced with a multiplicity of inconsistent and poten-
tially binding state laws, corporate actors, particularly directors and
managers, will be able to take no action at all or, what is little better, will
have to run into court for a declaratory choice-of-law judgment before
taking any action. But this corporate paralysis scenario does not belong
in a discussion of control shares statutes: the choice-of-law uncertainty
that they produce does not principally afflict corporate directors or
managers, but rather corporate acquirors. A control shares statute does
not impinge upon general corporate operations or business transactions.
To the limited extent that it affects directors or managers, they may
eliminate all choice-of-law uncertainty by opting out of the statute's
coverage.
It is pretty plain, in fact, that the only party who might really complain
about the choice-of-law uncertainties is the acquiror. And his uncertainty
has nothing to do with corporate paralysis; it is not the kind of uncer-
tainty that adherents of the internal affairs doctrine are properly
concerned about. His uncertainty in this field is no different that his
uncertainty over the applicable law in any million or billion dollar
transaction he might be contemplating. The cost of obtaining a declara-
tory choice-of-law judgment-if there were genuine choice-of-law uncer-
tainty-would add to his expense only negligibly. 70 Indeed, sorting
through the web of state and federal regulations applicable to much
simpler transactions will be a good deal more complicated for him than
resolving whether an Oklahoma control shares statute applies to his
takeover of a Delaware corporation.
There is, however, a lingering sense that state regulation of foreign
corporations does not present a choice-of-law problem "like any other."
There is a sense that choice-of-law uncertainty in this area might be
particularly debilitative to national commerce. In addition, there is the
alluring availability of a simple rule-the internal affairs doctrine- that
would eliminate in one stroke all the potential difficulties. If any chance
exists that the "free market"7 1 depends on choice-of-law certainty in the
" According to some commentators, however, the continental countries have lately
begun to shift toward the rule of lex incorporationis. See, e.g., Kozyris, supra note 3, at
53-54.
70 The acquiror could certainly initiate his tender offer first and then sue for a
declaratory judgment while the offer was pending. Indeed acquirors already frequently
initiate their offer first and then sue for a judgment invalidating those state laws that stand
in their way.
"' CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1650 (1987).
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field of corporate governance, or that uncertainty in this area would bring
commerce to "a sudden halt, '72 would it not be wiser to avoid the risk and
impose once and for all that simple rule?
It is of course questionable whether this last line of objection-
appealing solely to simplicity and economic policy-amounts to a consti-
tutional argument at all. But let us assume that it does. The question
then becomes whether the internal affairs doctrine is really the simpli-
fying and indispensable rule that its proponents claim it to be. Part IV of
this article is an attempt to show that the internal affairs doctrine has
never offered, and cannot offer, a coherent solution to the choice-of-law
problems posed by state regulation of foreign corporations.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The regulation of foreign corporations is by no means a new issue. The
American legal system has been trying for centuries to accommodate the
thorny interests implicated when corporations do business outside the
state in which they were chartered. Predictably, the accommodation has
not been very stable in its theory or practice.
A. Two Conflicting Lines of Analysis
The essential problem is that American corporations law has always
sought to respect two lines of analysis that cannot at bottom be
reconciled. First, because the image of a state "bringing corporations
into being" has figured so prominently in our jurisprudence, it has
always been understood that a corporation is to be governed primarily
by the incorporating state. This idea was so strong that state courts used
to refuse even to entertain some suits against a foreign corporation, on
the ground that only the incorporating state had power to enforce
judgments against it.73 Simultaneously, however, it has always been
equally well understood that a corporation had to obey the laws of each
state in which it did business regardless of where it was incorporated.
And on the theory that a state could exclude the corporation altogether if
the state so chose, it followed (because the greater power was assumed to
include the lesser) that a state could subject a foreign corporation to
virtually any reasonable regulations as a condition of doing business
there. 74
72 TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
71 See, e.g., North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Md. 1885).
Indeed, the "internal affairs doctrine" originally referred to this doctrine of jurisdictional
abstention, see Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33
BROOKLYN L. REv. 219, 235-36 (1966), which in its extreme manifestations was later rejected
by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
" See Kaplan, supra note 17, at 443.
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Both these lines of thinking developed in contented ignorance of each
other right up to their logical limits. Thus it is possible to find pre-modern
Supreme Court cases holding both that states violate the Constitution
when they attempt to apply their own corporations law to foreign
corporations, 75 and that states may do with a foreign corporation any-
thing and everything they do with domestic corporations.7 6
The distinction drawn to accommodate these competing principles is, as
described earlier, between the "internal affairs" of a corporation and its
"external affairs." Regarding matters "peculiar to the corporation," as it
is sometimes said, or matters affecting the relationships of corporate
members or actors inter se, only the incorporating state has power to
legislate. Insofar as the corporation had dealings with the "outside"
world, however, the state in which these dealings took place has full
regulatory authority.
If this distinction had really been adhered to, or if it even could have
been, those insisting on the indispensability of the internal affairs
doctrine would stand on much firmer ground. In fact, however, the
internal affairs rule has often been rejected by the courts. These devia-
tions from the rule undermine both the empirical claim at issue-that
interstate commerce will be thrown into turmoil if the internal affairs
doctrine is not rigorously enforced-and the theoretical foundations of
the doctrine itself.
B. The Problem with the Internal Affairs Doctrine
The problem with the internal affairs doctrine is essentially the same
as the problem with John Stuart Mill's doctrine of self-regarding acts:
there are none. No corporate affairs are ever exclusively "internal"; they
" E.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). The Court's language is as broad as can
be imagined:
The assessment [of shareholder liability] is an incident of the incorporation. Thus
the subject matter is peculiarly within the regulatory power of New York, as the
State of incorporation.... For 'as marriage looks to domicil, membership lin a
corporation] looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting the
incorporation.'
Id. at 643-44 (quoting Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925)). This
holding rested on an interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (not the Commerce
Clause), which has subsequently been overruled. See supra note 19; infra text accompany-
ing notes 98 & 99.
7" E.g., Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305 (1892). The language used in
sucA cases is eqlly Uuou.
Having the absolute power of excluding the foreign corporation the State may, of
course, impose such conditions upon permitting the corporations to do business
within its limits as it may judge expedient .... It does not lie in any foreign
corporation to complain that it is subjected to the same law with the domestic
corporation.
Id. at 315.
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will always have consequences of greater or lesser magnitude on the
"outside" world. If a corporation's internal affairs adversely affect share-
holders, then a state in which a substantial number of those shareholders
live will also be adversely affected. If they adversely affect the corpora-
tion's business or finances, then a state enjoying that business or finance
will also be adversely affected. The spillover may be negligible, or the
external effects may not be adverse but rather beneficial to everyone, in
which case things will proceed happily for the internal affairs doctrine
without choice-of-law questions ever arising. But as soon as harm is
threatened-as soon, that is, as there is anything to which a non-
incorporating state may, in practice, want to apply its law-choice-of-law
questions immediately crop up, and if the state in question can claim
more important ties to the corporation than the incorporating state, the
internal affairs doctrine is suddenly cast away.
Consider the distribution of corporate dividends. No matter is more
"peculiar to the corporation"; none more clearly involves corporate
relationships inter se. Yet in certain circumstances, particularly when
insolvency is at stake, the declaration of dividends will without doubt
have serious "external" consequences. Thus, in what remains today the
leading case on this point, Justice (then Judge) Cardozo wrote for New
York's highest court that the state would not hesitate to apply its own law
to a foreign corporation in such circumstances.77 His words are worth
quoting at length:
As long as a foreign corporation keeps away from this state it is
not for us to say what it may do or not do. But when it comes into
this state and transacts its business here, it must yield obedience
to our laws. For many purposes the fiction of its residence in the
state of its origin must then be disregarded. This statute makes
no attempt to regulate foreign corporations while they keep
within their domicile.... If they take the corporation out of [our]
state, they may declare dividends as they please. If they elect to
keep it with us, they must not lead it into paths of ruin. In these
days, when countless corporations, organized on paper in neigh-
boring states, live and move and have their being in New York, a
7 German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915). The case
presented a conflict between New York law, which permitted the corporation to sue its
directors for declaring dividends improperly, and New Jersey law, which did not. The case
does not squarely hold that New York law would govern the issue of the lawfulness of the
dividends. Id. at 877 (reserving the question). The issue, however, of directors' liability to a
corporation is, if anything, more "internal" an affair than that of a dividend's propriety. In
any event, the language of the case (quoted in the text) is so strong that it virtually compels
the conclusion that New York law would apply to the latter issue as well, and the case was
later so construed. See International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1948).
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sound public policy demands that our Legislature be invested
with this measure of control. If the control is irksome, it may be
avoided by leaving us. 78
Other courts have repeatedly employed similar reasoning on such
"internal" issues as reclassification of stock,79 dissolution of the
corporation, 0 standing to bring a derivative action,8 1 purchases by a
corporation of its own stock,8 2 the issuance of new stock,83 the standards
of a majority shareholder's fiduciary duties,8 4 and as in German-
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, the distribution of dividends.8 5 Indeed, New
York and California, as discussed earlier, have codified the holding of
German-American Coffee into their statutory law.86
Yet, perhaps it will still be said that at least as to shareholder voting
rights, the matter regulated by a control shares statute, only the law of
the incorporating state should apply. Here too, however, courts have
applied the law of a state with more substantial contacts to the matter at
issue than those of the incorporating state.8 7
The first implication of the cases just described is that they provide
further evidence that interstate commerce survives perfectly well even if
78 216 N.Y. at 64 (citations omitted).
7' E.g., State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 918 (1949).
o E.g., Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982).
s E.g., Stephenson v. Landogger, 337 F. Supp. 591, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d
133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
2 E.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
" E.g., Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 633, error dismissed, 253 U.S. 475 (1918).
14 E.g., Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952).
" International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1948). In
addition, the Supreme Court has itself held that one state may apply its own law to
determine whether an act performed in that state by a resident of that state resulted in
making him a shareholder of another state's corporation. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express,
314 U.S. 201 (1941). See generally Latty, supra note 17, at 150-55 (discussing cases that do
not apply the internal affairs rule).
s See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (Deering 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-20 (McKinney
1986). These statutes are discussed supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
87 E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying a New
York statute to a Panamanian corporation on the issue of parent/subsidiary voting rights);
Tankersley v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 514 F.2d
956 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying Illinois law to voting trust of Delaware corporation); Wilson
v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, inc., 1i8 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982)
(applying California cumulative voting law to a Utah corporation); Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (applying California cumulative
voting law to a foreign corporation); Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell, 15 Ohio St. 3d
284, 473 N.E.2d 807 (1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985) (applying Ohio law to a voting
agreement made by the shareholders of a Delaware corporation). The Wilson case contains
a fairly sophisticated discussion of the constitutional issues.
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the internal affairs rule is not rigorously adhered to. Corporations have
already been opened up to the uncertainty of modern choice-of-law
interest analysis, and the heralded catastrophe has not materialized.
There is, in addition, a second and more critical point. If the German
American Coffee line of cases merely presented the problem of so-called
"pseudo-foreign" corporations-corporations whose foreignness consisted
exclusively in the naked fact of out-of-state incorporation-then these
cases would constitute no more than a fairly manageable, perhaps
uncontroversial exception to the internal affairs rule. They would not
fundamentally challenge the rule itself. After all, even the Restatement
permits departure from the internal affairs rule where a foreign corpo-
ration has virtually no real contacts with its incorporating state.88
The problem of "pseudo-foreign" corporations, however, is in reality a
limiting case of a much deeper and more pervasive difficulty in the
internal affairs doctrine. The concept of "internal" affairs requires a
parallel, opposing concept of externality; clearly no one is prepared to
preclude a state in which a foreign corporation does business from
applying its own law when the corporation has contractual or tortious
dealings with that state's citizens. The internal affairs doctrine is
necessarily inapplicable when interests external to the corporation are
implicated. As the Supreme Court itself has stated: "As a general matter,
the law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating
to the internal affairs of a corporation .... Different conflicts principles
apply, however, where the rights of third parties external to the corpora-
tion are at issue." 9
This formulation, meant simply to set forth the internal affairs
doctrine, in fact undermines the doctrine's very foundation. The most
"internal" of corporate affairs, as we have seen, can affect third-party
rights. There can be no bright line-indeed no line at all-drawn to
separate internal and external affairs; a corporation's internal affairs are
external affairs when they implicate third-party rights.
Case law bears out this fundamental incoherence in the internal affairs
doctrine. When third parties, typically creditors who are residents of the
forum state, sue a foreign corporation or its members, courts have not
hesitated to find that seemingly internal matters are in this context
external affairs subject to the forum state's law.90 For example, in a case
s See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 302 comment g.
s First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621
(1983) (original emphasis).
" See, e.g., Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941) (forum state may
apply its law to the question of whether defendant was technically a stockholder of the
corporation); Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914) (forum state may apply its law to
the issue of shareholder liability where the shareholder consented to the corporation's doing
business in that state); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 878 (10th Cir. 1982) (forum
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where liability turned on the question of whether the foreign corporation
had been validly incorporated, the Tenth Circuit held as follows:
We are not unaware of the rule that the internal affairs of the
corporation, such as the relationship of the officers and directors
to the corporation, are governed by the state of incorporation. In
this case the validity of the corporation arises in the context of
fraud and misrepresentations to third parties. Thus, it was not an
internal matter.91
In reality then, the internal affairs doctrine can provide no certainty
whatsoever: the applicability of the doctrine may be determined by the
"context" in which it is raised, and the interests of third parties can
supply courts with a perfectly principled basis on which to disregard the
law of the incorporating state in favor of a local law more sympathetic to
the forum state's interests. At the same time, it is easy to find cases
adhering to the internal affairs doctrine even though third-party inter-
ests were clearly affected thereby. 92
A radical open-endedness is thus inherent in the internal affairs
doctrine and cannot be avoided so long as "internal" affairs are defined as
distinct from matters affecting third-party rights. And this distinction is
itself inescapable in order for states to be able to protect their own
residents in dealings with foreign corporations-a limitation on the
internal affairs doctrine that has always been regarded as indispensable.
Of course, despite its open-endedness, the internal affairs rule may be
perfectly justifiable as a tool of choice-of-law jurisprudence, which has to
a large extent embraced a case-by-case, context-specific analysis. For
constitutional purposes, however, where the entire argument in favor of
the internal affairs rule rests on the supposed certainty, uniformity and
state may apply its law to the issue of whether a corporation had been validly incorporated);
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass.
1987) (stating that the internal affairs rule did not apply to the issue of shareholder liability
where "the rights of third parties" were involved); Edwards v. Schillinger, 91 N.E. 1048,
1051 (Ill. 1910) (holding that the term "internal affairs" did not embrace matters affecting
creditors' rights); Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345 (1892) (applying forum state's law to
issue of incorporator's liability).
9' Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 878 (10th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
92 See, e.g., Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 778 F.2d 547, 550 (10th Cir.
1985) (applying doctrine to the issue of voidability of a contract made by the corporation
with a third party); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987) (applying
doctrine to determine voting rights of foreign corporation's subsidiary, thereby affecting the
rights of the subsidiary's shareholders); Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428
N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980) (applying doctrine to shareholders' agreement and annulling certain
business contracts made by the corporation because they violated the shareholders'
agreement).
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predictability to which the rule is claimed to give rise, the situation is
plainly quite different.
Constitutionalizing the internal affairs doctrine would not produce the
absolute choice-of-law certainty and predictability that is generally
supposed. Difficult choice-of-law problems would still arise; the only
difference is that they would take the form of attempts to distinguish
"internal" from "external" affairs. Instead of producing ease and predict-
ability, the doctrine will devolve into a case-by-case analysis measuring
the "external" effects of putative "internal" conduct and then, inevitably,
balancing those effects against the need for choice-of-law certainty.
The inevitability of this development is particularly foreseeable with
respect to state regulation of tender offers. A change in control of a
corporation is not easily categorized as an "internal" or an "external"
event. Justice White tried to answer this question definitively in MITE,
stating that "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockhold-
ers to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs
of the target company. '93 On the other hand, ordinary mergers may
equally "contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party,"
yet mergers have always been understood to be within the incorporating
state's legislative province. 94 In fact, a great number of the myriad
defenses to hostile takeover attempts that states might want to regu-
late-shareholder rights plans ("poison pills"), greenmail, restructurings,
the issuance of preferred stock with various covenants or voting provi-
sions, control shares procedures, and so on-could all be characterized as
matters of purely "internal" corporate governance.
State takeover law is, moreover, rapidly evolving. The control shares
statute is not the only form of takeover regulation currently in use;
several states are experimenting with "business combination statutes"
that give the incumbent directors enormous power in deciding whether to
approve a proposed acquisition. Unless the directors approve the takeover
offer before the acquisition of shares is consummated, the acquiror cannot
for a period of several years combine in any way with the target company
(which is usually considered necessary for the acquiror to reap its
anticipated profit).95 The "internal" or "external" nature of this form of
takeover regulation will invariably be a subject of vigorous debate. Yet it
is difficult to see how the question can even be meaningfully approached.
The truth is that corporate control contests are simultaneously both
"internal" and "external" corporate affairs; they go to the heart of
corporate governance but also implicate important rights and interests of
third parties-those of the acquirors as well as those of local business or
9 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
9 The CTS Court made this point as a fairly explicit rebuttal to the MITE analysis. See
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 106 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987).
" See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
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employee communities. For this reason, the internal affairs doctrine
cannot coherently provide choice-of-law stability in this field.
In fact, it seems quite clear that the terms "internal" and "external"
must end up as purely conclusory labels should the internal affairs rule
be constitutionalized. So long as a matter ceases to be purely "internal"
to a corporation when the regulating state can claim that its interests
may be seriously injured by the transaction in question, then the
internal/external analysis will be nothing more than standard choice-
of-law interest analysis under a different name. The internal affairs
doctrine will not solve the choice-of-law difficulties; it can only mask
those difficulties under a formalistic effort to distinguish between "in-
ternal" and "external" matters.
V. CONCLUSION
Today there is once again an increasing "Delawarization" of this
country's corporations.9 6 To constitutionalize the internal affairs doctrine
would, as Professor Buxbaum has observed, create a corresponding
"Delawarization" of the entire country's corporations law. 97 For the sake
of a simplicity or certainty, the need and prospects for which appear to be
greatly exaggerated, such a holding would sacrifice the value of diversity
and experimentation among state corporation codes (in particular among
legislative responses in the takeover context) as well as the legitimate
interests of those states that are the true business "homes" of certain
corporations but that would be constitutionally disabled from protecting
their interests.
It is perhaps a flaw in federal law (constitutional and statutory) that it
provides no choice-of-law rules as between the laws of states that have
significant contacts to a given subject matter. But that deficiency exists,
and in virtually every area of law today, "interest analysis" is the
accepted means of resolving choice-of-law questions. The day is past when
conflicts law and, indeed, Full Faith and Credit law employed tests
looking mechanically to the "jurisdiction where a particular event
occurred."98 To hold that the Commerce Clause requires courts mechan-
ically to enforce the internal affairs doctrine would be to adopt a course
that has already been tried and rejected: "a choice-of-law analysis which,
for all intents and purposes, gave an isolated event-[the chartering of
the corporation in a particular state]- controlling constitutional signif-
9' See Buxbaum, supra note 12, at 33 & n.20.
9' See id. at 35.
9' Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.l1 (1981) (plurality opinion); see
also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (adopting the Allstate plurality
analysis); supra note 12.
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icance, even though there might have been contacts with another state"
that justify application of its law instead.99
It seems highly unwarranted to single out corporations law as the only
area in which ordinary choice-of-law rules, policies of comity, and the
enforcement by each state of other state's prior adjudications cannot be
expected adequately to deal with a problem encountered in every aspect
of a multi-sovereign system. 0 0 There is no empirical evidence supporting
the view that these mechanisms are inadequate in this context, and there
seems small doctrinal justification for constitutionalizing this particular
fraction of the commercial choice-of-law field.
At the most, one might suggest a Commerce Clause rule that only the
state of incorporation or a state with such substantial contacts that it
may claim to be the corporation's business domicile (as defined by high
percentages of assets, revenues, employees, etc.) may regulate the corpo-
ration's "internal" affairs self-governance. In addition, a significant
resident shareholder percentage might also be required. This test would
not purport to create perfect choice-of-law certainty. Conflicts might still
arise-primarily between the incorporating state and the business domi-
cile state but also occasionally between states able to satisfy a business
domicile test-as in fact they have already. The point, however, would be
to minimize the potential number of states that might legitimately claim
to regulate a given corporation's "internal" affairs without engraving in
stone the unwarranted, impolitic, and ultimately unsuccessful rigidities
of the internal affairs doctrine.
99 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 n.11 (plurality opinion).
100 See Buxbaum, supra note 12, at 45-52.
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